The Bush team deserves this applause, however, only if this objective was achieved without sacrificing more important U.S. interests or contributing to the possibility of more serious and dangerous future problems.
It's quite natural for the American public to feel great concern for the safety of Americans in trouble. When the Americans are military personnel, however, we should keep in mind the reason for their existence. We train and equip our military to pursue and safeguard our objectives and interests even in the most dangerous situations. When danger materializes it makes no sense to suggest that our first priority is to get our personnel out of danger, not if in doing so we sacrifice the goals and interests they have been trained and equipped to protect. We cannot therefore applaud the Bush Administration for getting our people back to safety until we have evaluated the price we paid for their safe return. After all, when an adversary threatens our military personnel it may always be possible to procure their safety by capitulation. It would seem less than prudent to approve such methods as brilliant diplomacy.
In this particular case Chinese military aircraft harassed an unarmed American surveillance craft in a fashion that damaged the aircraft, endangered the lives of the crew, and ultimately forced the plane to land. All this took place in international airspace. It does not require a lot of imagination to see this as a deliberate provocation by the Chinese government intended to test the will and resolve of the new administration. The circumstances of this test involved an important issue of principle. Since the earliest years of its existence the United States has strenuously defended the right of all nations to make non-hostile use of international traffic lanes without fear or intimidation. In this case however, the Chinese government was doubtless also probing our reaction to territorial claims that have direct implications for our readiness to respond to aggressive Chinese actions against Taiwan.
Because of the disagreement over Taiwan, the U.S. Chinese relationship will, for the foreseeable future involve the possibility of serious confrontations. This is especially true in view of the aggressive, ambitious and contentious spirit that still animates Chinese military policy. Scenarios in which we would come to daggers drawn with the Chinese are not far-fetched. Accordingly, it is a crucial American interest to deal with the Chinese in such a way that they will never miscalculate our resolve. Our evaluation of the conduct of American diplomacy with respect to China must therefore always include the impact it might have on Chinese estimates of their ability to bully American officials into accepting aggressive Chinese demands. If an American administration leaves the impression that we are not resolved to defend our interests, it encourages Chinese presumption in a fashion that will contribute to more intense and dangerous confrontations in the future.
In this particular episode the Chinese aggressively violated the rights of the unarmed American military aircraft. When the provocation led to an emergency that forced the pilot of the aircraft to land, the Chinese government refused to extend respectful humanitarian assistance and instead adopted the posture that its territorial integrity and sovereignty had somehow been compromised. The Chinese announced an investigation, and treated the American crew as detained suspects. Finally, with breathtakingly cold-blooded temerity, they demanded an apology from the United States.
The last maneuver was undoubtedly the shrewdest. It focused attention on the issue of whether or not the United States should apologize, distracting entirely from the issue of China's unlawful and aggressive behavior. It also left the impression that in the U.S.-China relationship China’s estimate of what it has to lose is outweighed by its sense of what America’s leaders think they have to gain. Chinese leaders seem to realize that in diplomacy as in war the actual strength of opposing forces is less important than the opinion each side has about the price it may have to pay. In this case it is quite likely that the Chinese were bluffing. Unfortunately for America, given the Bush administration's all too gullible response, we will never know.
The U.S. Administration is left, on the other hand, in the less enviable position of debating with the American people about what the meaning of ‘is’ is. Yes, we told the Chinese we’re sorry, in fact very sorry, twice, but this is not what it seems to be, since we’re very sorry for the tragic consequences of their actions and they’re not. Yes, the Chinese were harassing our aircraft, in international airspace, at the risk of American lives, but it was not what it seemed to be because the emergency landing took place in Chinese airspace. The Chinese people got an unambiguous translation, and the American people must be content with a duplicitous text, but we shouldn’t feel shamed because our free government deals with us truthfully, while their oppressive regime feeds them cleverly manipulative propaganda. The Clinton Administration might have produced a more tangled skein of double talk and prevarication, but this is close enough for government work.
The new Administration could have acted with a greater sense of America’s objective interests, while still maintaining the possibility of constructive relations with the Chinese. In the first place, they should have presented the incident in its true light, as a quite probably calculated provocative act. Alluding to the supposedly peaceable relations between our countries, they should have made clear our expectation that our crew would be treated accordingly. Consistent with this expectation, we should have required the release of the crew and the aircraft at the earliest possible moment, absent which actions we would be compelled to conclude that the Chinese did not value our constructive relations. In light of their decision, we should have made clear, we would then take appropriate steps to reflect the changes they appeared to desire, including the curtailment of our lucrative trade relationship. Finally we should have expressed our willingness to wait until we had verified all the facts first hand before demanding an explanation and if appropriate an apology from the Chinese government. This mode of action, warranted by the facts and our international rights, would have left responsibility for the decision about continued positive relations clearly in the hands of the Chinese leaders, where, given their responsibility for the provocation, it belongs, but it would have left control of those relations in our hands, where in light of objective realities, it should remain.
There are two likely reasons for the Bush Administration’s failure to adopt this more strategic approach. First, the Chinese leaders appear to be right in their belief that the Administration puts too high a priority on the relationship with China as an end in itself, regardless of Chinese behavior. Second, the Administration appears determined to continue the Clinton Administration’s unwillingness to see the Chinese government as it sees itself, a trading partner of convenience but in principle an adversary. Where there is no adversary, there can be no strategic thinking. Unfortunately, if the U.S. abandons the strategic perspective while the Chinese persist in it, they gain the advantage a good general always has over those who cannot or will not acknowledge the possibility of battle.
Of course some people subscribe to the superstitious fantasy that we only have enemies because we think we do, or that they will be our friends if we pretend they are. It is wiser to base policy on actual behavior than on superstitious hopes, especially when dealing with a civilization that has outlasted so many other wishful thinkers. In this episode China’s behavior was outrageous in its aggressiveness and presumption, and chilling in its accurate perception of our leadership’s vulnerabilities.
To remedy the bad consequences that may flow from this bungled opening, the Bush Administration should consider steps that will leave the Chinese with no doubt that our actions will not continue to be so pliant and gullible. At the top of the list should be the steps that would strengthen Taiwan’s ability credibly to withstand future Chinese efforts aimed at probing our resolve. Of course such an approach would require that Bush Administration policymakers look beyond the dollar signs that mark so much of their thinking about our future with China, and starting taking seriously the signs that, though the Chinese leaders are taking our capital, they are by no means being bought with it. China’s rulers will resolutely advance toward their goals, working with or against us as it suits their objectives.
In the martial arts, two adversaries may look like they are dancers together, but only one prevails. If the U.S. wants to see a different outcome, we will need leaders who stop playing word games intended to manage the indignation of the American people, and who instead, without delusion or apology, turn back upon potential adversaries their provocative efforts to demonstrate American timidity.
(Dr. Keyes recently founded and serves as chairman of the Declaration Foundation, a communications center for founding principles. To visit their website click here.)
In every respect in its handling of this episode the Bush Administration played into the hands of the Chinese provocateurs. The Administration’s most important decision was to treat the episode as though it were not a provocation, but merely an accident that in itself had little significance. This decision confirmed the Chinese view that the leaders of the new Administration are far more afraid of damaging relations than they (the Chinese) are. (If the Chinese shared the American sensitivity they would not have staged the provocation to begin with.) It meant as well that there was, from the beginning, no danger that China would be called to account for its aggressive behavior. From this point on the question was not whether the Chinese would gain or lose by their gambit, only how much they stood to gain.
What could China achieve? Usually when a Republican administration comes in, its initial actions are like a fresh breeze wafting from the healthy precincts of American life and culture. The world is reminded that there are still Americans with enough moral confidence and pride to care about and defend our friends and interests without apology. At the very least, therefore, the Chinese could quietly demonstrate that America’s moral decay translates into weakness in the international arena that has not been affected by the advent of the new Republican Administration. They might also procure some American recognition for their expansive territorial claims over air and sea beyond their borders, or if not send the signal that those claims will be challenged only at the cost of continual provocations and tensions. At the high end of achievement, they might obtain a result that could be presented to the Chinese people as a victory over the Americans, proving that the new Administration offered no more hope to the forces that oppose the government’s repressive policies than the old one. After all, if China’s rulers are tough enough to force the most powerful external force for freedom to kowtow, what chance do the internal forces of opposition stand against them?
As it turned out, the Chinese government achieved all of these objectives, and then some.
There was no discernible difference between the way the Bush administration handled this episode, and the way the Clinton Administration would have handled it unless it be that the Clinton Administration would have been more honest about its capitulation. One former Clinton Administration official interviewed some time before the denouement did suggest use of duplicitous language as a way to obtain our prisoners’ release. In the event, it may seem harmless enough to engage in semantic arguments about whether the U.S. did or did not apologize. By not themselves releasing a carefully crafted Chinese translation, the Administration offers the Chinese the opportunity to present the matter to their own people in any way they please. Reportedly, they are doing so, using a Chinese phrase that implies American responsibility for both the death of the Chinese pilot and disrespect for China’s territorial claims. In the eyes of the Chinese people, the government looks strong enough to bully America into submission, and China’s aggressive violation of international norms appears to be an heroic defense of legitimate claims. We may later resist these Chinese claims with more resolve, but the text of our apology will be cited as proof of our duplicity, and used to rally support for the Chinese government’s reckless assertions. Thus they have not only discouraged internal opposition, they have further strengthened their position at home in the event of any future confrontation on such issues.
