The title of this discussion, put in the form of a question, hints at the opinion that in reality the expression “ religious education” is a contradiction in terms ie., that you cannot have religious instruction or catechesis, aimed at imparting belief in God and the supernatural, etc., which at the same time respects the demands of the educational process — a process essentially based on the autonomous decisions of the educand as to the truth or otherwise of the content of the instruction.
For this reason there are many who think that religious instruction should be banned from the curriculum of our schools and colleges. Religious catechesis, they argue, can only be delivered by indoctrination, a method which completely contradicts the autonomous element essential to any educative experience. Indeed, to introduce a personal note, during my years of full-time teaching, I met many students who had rejected the great claims of the world religions simply because in their opinion those same great truths had been drummed into them.
The question, therefore, translates to this: Is religious education possible without indoctrination? Before, however, we can answer this latter question, we must be clear about what we mean by “indoctrination”.
Looked at from a very general point of view, indoctrination can be said to be some sort of human activity. This activity seems to be connected with those processes we call educational; for the activity of teaching also finds its proper place in the educational process, and it is with this latter activity, teaching, that indoctrination is always compared or contrasted. Thus we hear of people, like those students I have already mentioned, who claim that they have not so much been taught as indoctrinated. We hear of people who are criticised as indoctrinators rather than teachers.
Indeed some educationalists locate indoctrination at a certain point upon what they like to call “the teaching continuum”. They go on to explain that teaching involves a number of different activities, ordered according to their relationship to the central activities of training in behaviour and conduct, and of instruction in knowledge and belief. These activities, they explain, demand an intelligent act of cooperation on the part of the learner Yet in proportion as the intelligent cooperation on the part of the learner is diminished, the activities are transformed, on the one hand from training into conditioning, and on the other from instruction into indoctrination.
This continuum can be further extended in the area of conduct through intimidation down to physical threats, and in the area of belief through propagandising down to lying. But to extend the continuum this far is to arrive at activities which no one would hesitate to exclude from the teaching process. Nevertheless the usefulness of such an extension is shown in the way it highlights by contrast those areas of the teaching process where vagueness and confusion do seem to exist about precisely what is being done under the guise of teaching.
To explain the vagueness of the instruction/ indoctrination distinction different commentators offer different reasons. To be brief, however, the situation can be summarised by accepting that different people use the word “indoctrination” in different senses.
It is apposite at this point to mention that at one time “indoctrination” was used to refer to any sort of teaching. A nominal definition reveals that the word means “to communicate a doctrine”, and one meaning of “doctrine” given in the Oxford English Dictionary is quite simply “what is taught”. Since its first appearance in our language, however, it has been narrowed down to mean a certain type of teaching.
So for many people indoctrination means “teaching by rote”. Hence early speech habits acquired at the pre-school stage can be said to be “indoctrinated”. The rules of safety-first, mathematical tables, foreign language vocabularies, arithmetical rules of thumb, all exemplify the results of the indoctrinatory process. Those who hold this view of indoctrination are, of course, perfectly entitled to hold it. But since we now have the more differentiated concept of “conditioning” of habits and skills, the use of “indoctrination” in this context merely adds confusion to an already vague concept. “Indoctrination” therefore, is more advisedly reserved, as suggested by some commentators, for the transmitting of beliefs and of attitudes based on these beliefs.
One criterion for a stricter application of the term is the transmission of beliefs in a non-evidential manner, and by this is meant transmission without regard for evidence, or contrary to evidence, or apart from good reasons and the canons for testing reasons and evidence. Hence on this view two people can hold the same true belief, but if one holds it evidentially , he holds it by instruction. If the other holds it non-evidentially, he holds it by indoctrination. In other words indoctrination is determined by the method of transmission, not its content.
The trouble with this view is that the symptoms that display a belief held non-evidentially are said to be marked by an incapacity seriously to consider conflicting evidence or entertain contrary reasons. In other words the “indoctrinated” belief is said to be held unshakeably, which in actual fact is the criterion of effect rather than method.
Another criterion for the stricter application of the term is based on the subject-matter or content of what is taught. And here we get to the hub of the objection to education in the spheres of religion, morals, and politics. These areas, the argument continues, all actually characterise indoctrination, and should therefore be scrapped from the school and college curriculum. “Indoctrination,” it is said, “represents something pernicious”. This argument, however, runs in a vicious circle. If moral beliefs, ie. the beliefs that this or that is good or bad are the result of indoctrination, then the premise from which this argument springs is itself the result of indoctrination. Hence it, too, is “pernicious”.
A reconciliation of these criteria (method, effect, content) is possible if it is seen that the effect of the indoctrinatory process ie. the transmission of unshakeable beliefs, is the major characterising element. Thus the effect will determine the method, which in turn will determine the content.
If this analysis is acceptable, then it will be appreciated that indoctrinatory teaching will depend on the intention of the teacher. The original question thus becomes: Can the teacher teach religion without intending to transmit unshakeable beliefs?
I would suggest that, although the dividing line between intending and hoping is a very thin one, there seems no contradiction in hoping that the beliefs remain permanent, while at the same not intending that they become so. Extreme care, however, must be taken in the choice of method and content to ensure that pupils/students are encouraged to make up their own minds.
As in all approaches to God and the supernatural, the pearl of great price is sincerity. If, after a serious study of the claims of the world’s great religions, the learner thinks in all sincerity, that he/she cannot accept them, then so be it.. The God of religion, if he/she exists, has not given Man the faculty of reason, which sets him above all other creatures, only to ask him to suspend it in any enquiry about His Very Own Self. If anything is true about the God-Man relationship, it is that ultimately it is the individual’s standing in the eyes of God that is important, and not vice-versa.
Hence it is incumbent upon all teachers of religion not merely to allow debate and discussion, but actively to encourage and foster those activities in the ultimate hope that, whatever conclusions his/her students reach, they should reach them in all sincerity. Thus religious education can truly flourish in our schools and colleges. Indoctrination, in the sense of the teacher’s intention to impart unshakeable beliefs in the minds of his/her students will be banished for ever.
John Melia was raised in Liverpool, England. He spent 9 years in Junior and Senior seminary before discerning his vocation to the married life. He spent his career teaching in the UK. He has three children and one grandchild.
